

The background of the book cover is a close-up, slightly blurred image of a US dollar bill. The green color of the bill is prominent, and some of the text and patterns on the bill are visible, though not sharp. The title is centered over this background.

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# ADVANCED CORPORATE FINANCE

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*Policies and Strategies*

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