

The Art of Computer

Virus Research and Defense

"Of all the computer-related books I've read recently, this one influenced my thoughts about security the most. There is very little trustworthy information about computer viruses. Peter Szor is one of the best virus analysts in the world and has the perfect credentials to write this book."

—Halvar Flake, Reverse Engineer, SABRE Security GmbH

Peter Szor

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