# A public-key cryptosystem for quantum message transmission

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#### ABSTRACT

We present a quantum public-key cryptography protocol for quantum message transmission. The private key of this protocol includes three classical matrices: a generator matrix of a Goppa code, an invertible matrix and a permutation matrix. The public key is product of these three matrices. The encryption and decryption algorithms are merely quantum computations related with the transformations between bases of the quantum registers. The security of this protocol is based on the hypothesis that there is no effective algorithm of NP-complete problem.

Keywords: Quantum cryptography, public-key cryptography protocol, quantum computation, McEliece public-key cryptosystem.

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

A generator matrix *G* for a linear code *C* is a *k* by *n* matrix for which the rows are a basis of *C*. The parity check matrix *H* of *C* satisfies  $GH^T = 0$ . For every error  $e^{(j)}$ ,  $s^{(j)} = e^{(j)}H^T$  is called the syndrome of  $e^{(j)}$ . A Goppa code  $\Gamma(L, g)$  is a linear error-correcting code that is defined with Goppa polynomial g(z)[1]. There is a fast algorithm for decoding Goppa codes, but the general problem of finding a code word of a given weight in a linear binary code is NP-complete. Based on the idea of McEliece in classical cryptology [2] and the method suggested in [3], we present a quantum public-key cryptography protocol.

#### 2. ENCODING PROCESS

A quantum message is a sequence of pure states. Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to the encryption and decryption of a pure state. Suppose G is a generator matrix of a Goppa code, G' = SGP where S is an invertible matrix and P is a permutation matrix. We choose G' as the public key and (S, G, P) as the private key. The encoding and decoding process are:

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Quantum Optics and Applications in Computing and Communications II, edited by G.-C. Guo, H.-K. Lo, M. Sasaki, S. Liu, Proc. of SPIE Vol. 5631 (SPIE, Bellingham, WA, 2005) · 0277-786X/05/\$15 · doi: 10.1117/12.576938

Alice uses Bob's public key G' to encrypt the state  $\sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |m\rangle$  as below:

1. Alice performs the computation between two registers:

$$\hat{U}_{G'}\sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |m\rangle_{k} |0\rangle_{n} = \sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |m\rangle_{k} |mG'\rangle_{n},$$

where the symbol  $|\rangle_i$  represents the state of a register with *i* qubits, and the unitary operator  $\hat{U}_{G'}$  is defined as

$$\hat{U}_{G'}|m\rangle_{k}|s\rangle_{n}=|m\rangle_{k}|s\oplus mG'\rangle_{n};$$

and performs the computation:

$$\hat{U}_{G'^{-}}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|m\rangle_{k}|mG'\rangle_{n}=\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|m\oplus mG'G'^{-}\rangle_{k}|mG'\rangle_{n}=|0\rangle_{k}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mG'\rangle_{n},$$

where the unitary operator  $\ \hat{U}_{G'^{-}}$  is defined as

$$\hat{U}_{G'^{-}}|m\rangle_{k}|s\rangle_{n}=|m\oplus sG'^{-}\rangle_{k}|s\rangle_{n},$$

the matrix  $G'^{-}$  is a generalized inverse matrix of G'. Because G' is a full row rank matrix, there exists  $G'^{-}$  that satisfies  $G'G'^{-} = I_k$ . This is the condition that one can get  $\sum_m \alpha_m |mG'\rangle_n$  from  $\sum_m \alpha_m |m\rangle_k$ .

2. Alice adds the error victor  $e^{(i)}$  to the basis:

$$\hat{U}_{E^{(i)}}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mG'\rangle_{n}\equiv\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mG'\oplus e^{(i)}\rangle_{n}$$

and then sends the state to Bob.

# **3. DECODING PROCESS**

Bob uses his private key (S, G, P) to decrypt the state coming from Alice:

1. Bob performs the transformation of basis:

$$\hat{U}_{P^{-1}}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m} \left| mG' \oplus e^{(i)} \right\rangle_{n} \equiv \sum_{m}\alpha_{m} \left| mG'P^{-1} \oplus e^{(i)}P^{-1} \right\rangle_{n} = \sum_{m}\alpha_{m} \left| mSG \oplus e^{(j)} \right\rangle_{n}$$

2. Bob performs the computation between two quantum registers:

$$\hat{U}_{H}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}\big|mSG\oplus e^{(j)}\big\rangle_{n}\big|0\big\rangle_{n-k}=\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}\big|mSG\oplus e^{(j)}\big\rangle_{n}\big|s^{(j)}\big\rangle_{n-k}$$

where the unitary operator  $\hat{U}_{H}$  is defined as

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$$\hat{U}_{H}|m\rangle_{n}|s\rangle_{n-k}=|m\rangle_{n}|s\oplus mH^{T}\rangle_{n-k}.$$

- 3. Bob measures the second register to get  $s^{(j)}$ , and find  $e^{(j)}$  via the fast decoding algorithm of the Goppa code generated by G;
- 4. Bob minus the error victor:

$$\hat{U}_{e^{(j)}}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}\big|mSG\oplus e^{(j)}\big\rangle_{n}=\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}\big|mSG\big\rangle_{n},$$

where the unitary operator  $\hat{U}_{e^{(j)}}$  is defined as:

$$\hat{U}_{e^{(j)}}|m\rangle_n = |m \oplus e^{(j)}\rangle_n.$$

5. Bob performs the computation:

$$\hat{U}_{G^{-}}\sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |mSG\rangle_{n} |0\rangle_{k} = \sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |mSG\rangle_{n} |mSGG^{-}\rangle_{k}$$
$$= \sum_{m} \alpha_{m} |mSG\rangle_{n} |mS\rangle_{k}$$

where the unitary operator  $\hat{U}_{g^-}$  is defined as:

$$\hat{U}_{G^{-}}|m\rangle_{n}|s\rangle_{k}=|m\rangle_{n}|s\oplus mG^{-}\rangle_{k},$$

and the computation:

$$\hat{U}_{G}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mSG\rangle_{n}|mS\rangle_{k}=\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mSG\oplus mSG\rangle_{n}|mS\rangle_{k}=|0\rangle_{n}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mS\rangle_{k},$$

where the unitary operator  $\hat{U}_{G}$  is defined as:

$$\hat{U}_{G}|m\rangle_{n}|s\rangle_{k}=|m\oplus sG\rangle_{n}|s\rangle_{k}.$$

6. Bob performs the transformation of basis:

$$\hat{U}_{S^{-1}}\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mS\rangle_{k}\equiv\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|mSS^{-1}\rangle_{k}=\sum_{m}\alpha_{m}|m\rangle_{k},$$

and finally gets the state coming from Alice.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

We present a public-key cryptosystem of quantum message. The advantage of this cryptosystem is that the encryption and decryption algorithms are well-defined, which are merely involves computations related with the transformation between bases of the quantum registers, so that the public-key and the secret-key are merely some classical data. The security of this protocol in based on the hypothesis that there are no effective algorithms of NP-complete problem.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank G L. Long for useful discussions. This work was supported by the Fundamental Research Program of China under Grant No. 2001CB309300.

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